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Market Report
Yr 
Ago
4 Wks
Ago 4/29/11
Livestock and Products,
 Weekly Average
Nebraska Slaughter Steers,
  35-65% Choice, Live Weight. . . . . . . .
Nebraska Feeder Steers, 
  Med. & Large Frame, 550-600 lb.. . . .
Nebraska Feeder Steers,
  Med. & Large Frame 750-800 lb. . . . .
Choice Boxed Beef, 
  600-750 lb. Carcass. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Western Corn Belt Base Hog Price
  Carcass, Negotiated. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Feeder Pigs, National Direct
  50 lbs, FOB.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Pork Carcass Cutout, 185 lb. Carcass,   
  51-52% Lean.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Slaughter Lambs, Ch. & Pr., Heavy,
  Wooled, South Dakota, Direct. . . . . . .
National Carcass Lamb Cutout,
  FOB. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
$98.59
134.61
114.14
170.08
82.69
     *
89.97
     *
295.78
$124.55
160.08
138.37
188.06
88.22
       *
94.35
202.75
397.50
$116.78
157.75
134.25
184.56
91.80
       *
93.39
190.00
406.63
Crops, 
 Daily Spot Prices
Wheat, No. 1, H.W.
  Imperial, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Corn, No. 2, Yellow
  Omaha, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Soybeans, No. 1, Yellow
  Omaha, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Grain Sorghum, No. 2, Yellow
  Dorchester, cwt. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Oats, No. 2, Heavy
  Minneapolis, MN , bu. . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.90
3.60
9.82
5.70
2.05
7.60
7.12
13.69
11.80
3.75
7.75
7.43
13.98
12.00
3.42
Feed
Alfalfa, Large Square Bales, 
  Good to Premium, RFV 160-185
  Northeast Nebraska, ton. . . . . . . . . . .
Alfalfa, Large Rounds, Good
  Platte Valley, ton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Grass Hay, Large Rounds, Premium
  Nebraska, ton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Dried Distillers Grains, 10% Moisture, 
  Nebraska Average. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Wet Distillers Grains, 65-70% Moisture, 
  Nebraska Average. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
135.00
92.50
 
     *
107.00
36.00
140.00
72.50
       *
213.50
75.50
140.00
72.50
       *
217.00
78.50
*No Market
The problem of shared resources, especially Common
Pool Resources (CPRs), has been studied extensively. In
such cases (e.g. aquifers), if the users are driven solely by
self-interest and do not cooperate/coordinate their actions,
over-extraction occurs. However, over the years many
researchers (e.g. Ostrom, 2010) have found that users are not
always driven solely by self-interest, and often manage to
prevent the overuse of resources through self-regulation,
tempering their self-interest. Similarly, while the use of
other shared resources such as water in rivers and creeks and
the atmosphere may not lead to over-extraction, a variety of
“downstream” problems can arise, as exemplified in poor
quality of water in a downstream lake. Importantly, if the
upstreamers temper their behavior through empathetic con-
siderations, they will reduce the problem by undertaking
costly actions. This situation raises two interesting empirical
questions. First, is there a difference in behavior of the
upstreamers if their decision is framed as a decision
regarding profit maximization with resulting pollution,
versus if their decision is framed as a costly decision on
avoiding pollution. Second, whether downstreamers can
potentially influence the behavior of upstreamers through
the use of non-monetary sanctions (e.g. positive/negative
word-of-mouth, display of social (dis)approval, etc.).
To test these questions we designed a three-player game.
The game involved an upstream farmer who chooses a
conservation technology which affects downstream water
pollution; a water user who draws drinking water from the
downstream river/lake; and a player with a dual role – she is
an upstream farmer and thus chooses a tillage practice, but
she is also affected by the quality of drinking water. After
both farmers choose their tillage practice, we report the
resulting cleanliness of the lake to the downstream water
user. They can subsequently express a positive or negative
emotion by sending a (costly) smiley or a frowney face
(Figure 1 on next page). Each subject participated in one of
three treatments: EMPATHY, SELF-INTEREST and NEUTRAL
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FRAME. These treatments differed from each other in the
language that was used to describe the experiment. The
empathy treatment used language that nudged subjects
towards more empathetic behavior. Similarly, the self-
interest treatment nudged towards pure profit
maximization, whereas the neutral frame removed all
loaded context. The game, conducted in the Experimental
and Behavioral Economics
Laboratory in the Department of
Agricultural Economics, had a total
of 216 people participate. The
subjects earned on average $28.90,
depending on their choices in the
game. 
The EMPATHY scenario led to
higher quality water downstream
(Figure 2). Priming for empathy
works, as compared to neutral,
context-free framing; whereas
priming for self-interest does not.
This suggests that the mere
presence of environmental context
t e m p e r s  s e l f - i n t e r e s t
considerations. We also found that
the downstreamers demonstrated
substantial willingness to (costly)
express their emotions: smiley or
frowney emoticons were sent in
more than 60 percent of the cases
in the environmental framing
treatments, and 35 percent in the
neutral scenario. In the SELF-
INTEREST FRAME and the EMPATHY
FRAME treatment, 90 and 60
percent, respectively, of emoticons
sent were frowneys. The NEUTRAL
FRAME was the only treatment in
which the downstream water users sent
more smileys than frowneys. Finally, we observed that the
effectiveness of emotion expression is comparable to the
empathetic framing (Figure 2). After emotional feedback
was sent, the statistical differences between the EMPATHY
and SELF-INTEREST FRAME had disappeared. This is an
indication that explicitly expressed emotions, even though
not used by everyone, work similarly to the implicit appeal
to emotions through framing.    
There are three important implications derived from
our study. First, our experiment supports that framing is
highly effective in changing the behavior of subjects.
EMPATHY FRAMING leads to an enhanced quality of water
downstream. In fact, it is crucial to pay particular attention
to the language in which the environmental policies are
formulated and presented to the public. Second, the
subjects with a higher stake in the cleanliness of the lake
contributed much more towards this, than those with no
stake. We observe this effect despite the identical Nash
equilibrium for both types. This finding is in line with the
metaeconomics approach and dual-interest framework (see
http://agecon.unl.edu/metaeconomics): the up-streamers who
were placed into the situation of “walking in the shoes of”
downstreamers displayed more empathetic behavior than the
upstreamers who could only imagine how it feels. So it is
important to encourage the involvement of people living
upstream (downstream) in the
environmental problems of the
downstream (upstream) regions.
Third, negative emotional feedback
(non-monetary punishment) is an
effective tool in positively
influencing environmental choices
and leading to more equitable
distributions. Hence, it should be
considered in addition to the
standard policies of monetary
sanctions and rewards. Overall,
empathy plays a substantive role.
Achieving environmental quality
(and quantity) goals is not only
about self-interest.
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Figure 1. Example of an emotional feedback screen in 
EMPATHY FRAME.
Figure 2. Average Lake Cleanliness by Round
